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African Development Bank and World Bank
by T. E. Mswaka, St. Andrews * J n their annual report for 1966, the Board of Directors of the African Development Bank (ADB) complained of the tendency of member countries of the Bank to "channel projects in the first instance to customary sources of finance, coming to the African Development Bank if they are unsuccessful elsewhere." These were the early years of the operations of the Bank before it had had time to prove itself. The ADB has now been in existence for at least seven years. What this article is concerned with is the extent to which the Bank could be looked upon as an alternative if not a primary source of funds by its members vis-a-vis the World Bank and other institutions, and tries to compare the terms on which those funds are available from the ADB and the World Bank.
ADB's Problems of Competitiveness
Over the period 1966--72 the ADB has not benefited substantially, if at all, from the shift of the source of aid and grants from bilateral to multilateral organisations. Of the total African net receipt of aid of $ 1,607.65 mn in 1967-69, 15.8 p.c order to lend. In 1970, UA (Units of Account) 39 mn were outstanding on the amount due of UA 106.8 mn 3. In addition to the problems of arrears, the Bank has been faced by three other problems all of which relate to its ability to compete with established alternative institutions.
[] The first problem relates to competition with the World Bank. The World Bank is not only the oldest institution in the business, well-known and commanding massive resources compared to those of the ADB, but was even more active over the period since the Bank came into existence. While only 12.8 p.c. of the World Bank Group financial commitments to the developing countries from 1946--1968 went to East and West (excluding North) Africa, in the period 1969-73 alone, such commitments were 14.8 p.c. 4.
[] The second problem from which the ADB has suffered is the lack of diversification of the funds, available to it which made it impossible to offer attractive terms to its potential borrowers. As is well known, the World Bank has its soft arm in the International Development Association (IDA) which offers loans at attractive rates of interest and for longer periods. 
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Bank has been forced to examine its projects more carefully and to restrict its activities far below the capital requirements of the continent.
African Members Only?
It is not necessary here to go into the detailed question of the membership composition, structure and lending policies of the ADBa. It is, however, important to note that the Bank has sailed very closely to the modus operandi and policies of the World Bank and similar institutions, against which, and because of its limited resources, it cannot compete. The Bank itself realises this. It also realises that the restriction of membership to African countries only has probably resulted in its being unable to attract funds for its activities compared to the Asian Development Bank. Evidence for this realisation is the recent and current discussion within the Bank, on whether or not the institution should open its doors to some qualified membership of the non-African states and institutions.
This discussion tends to presuppose that wider membership of the organisation and more funds at ADB's disposal will necessarily mean that the Bank is able to attract more business from its membership and away from its competitors. This is, however, most unlikely for the first reason that financial resources available to it will not approximate, let alone exceed, those of its competitors. Secondly, the only sigrdficant means of increasing its resources is to attract non-African membership among the largest potential contributors. But if this were possible, it must be implicitly assumed that such members will want to exercise some influence on the disposal of funds and the terms attaching to them. Here, the difference between the 8 For a lengthy discussion of these see John W h i t e, Regional Development Banks, ODI, 1971. successes of the Inter-American and the Asian Development Banks is not only the favourable climate of aid giving which the Inter-American Development Bank harvested from, during its long period of operation; but also in the case of the Asian DB, a long established consortia tradition not altogether dissimilar in concept and operation, was successfully exploited. These latter institutions have been more fortunate in having rich and immediate geographical neighbours closely identifying their own interests with those of their respective regions as a whole: the United States in the case of the Inter-American Bank, and Japan and Australia in the case of the Asian Bank.
ADB's Loan Commitments
Further doubts on the ADB's ability to become the principal source of funds for the African countries, assuming more funds at its disposal, stem from the extent to which it will be possible for it to break out of the straitjacket of the canons of development banking --bankable theory, etc. Given the financial resources at its disposal, and allowing for substantial increases in the future, it will have to substantially soften its terms to the recipients of its funds. A very rough analysis of its loan commitments up to February 1972 suggests a grant equivalent of its loan commitments of about 47.6 p.c. compared to the World Bank's 69 p.c. in 1971 9. The average interest rate (weighted) of the ADB loans was 5.34 p.c. with an average maturity period of 15.17 years (including grace period). The interest rate compares with 9 "Grant element" is defined as the difference between the face value of the loan and the present value, calculated at 10 p.c. discount rate, of the stream of interest and amortization payments, expressed as a percentage of the face value of the loan, see B. A. 
Fundamental Reappraisal Necessary
Limited resources of the Bank and poverty of the clients suggest that it would have to seek lo ADB, Annual Reports, 1967-71, end Press Releases. FORUM cooperation in joint financing of loans and projects with other institutions in the field. To do this, it would obviously have to abandon its cherished position and pride of being truly an African institution in structure and mode of operation. Indeed, joint financing has taken place to some extent in the last few years and is likely to continue. Discussion on diversification of the membership of the Bank shows that it is even prepared to reconsider its purely African character. Alterations in the composition of its membership will have a marginal effect as long as there is no change in its overall position and as long as it does not alter its basic policies.
The question therefore is whether the time has not come when it must have a fundamental reappraisal of the whole organisation of its finances. In such a reorganisation, the distinction in its priorities might be between inter-African projects and those which are purely national. With its primary capital resources arising from contributions from its members, such funds could be exclusively utilised in the development of inter-African infrastructure which is so necessary and urgent in the encouragement of intra-African trade. On these funds and their use, the Bank would retain its independence of decision and action except only in cases where there was joint financing. But even here, it would be the dominant contributor and therefore the major influence.
In its efforts to establish a special fund, there could be more of these funds along the lines of the Asian Development Bank, on subject or sector lines. Both the membership and the contributions to these special funds would be open to nonAfrican States and organisations. The principle adopted by the West African Rice Devel-140 opment Association (WARDA) whereby African country members contribute to the administrative budget and non-African to the projects, might usefully be adopted here. As African states belong to the poorest regions of the developing countries, African capital needs encompass practically the whole of their development spectrum. Some order of priority in the establishment of special funds would have to be made by the Bank in consultation with its member states. Whatever order of priorities will be agreed upon, the advantage of this approach is that the special funds would be action-oriented to specific areas, and the fact of their existence would relieve the Bank of pressure on its limited resources. This will enable the Bank to concentrate them on making the continent truly interdependent in trade.
ADB and Multilateral Institutions
On current evidence of the shift in sources of aid from bilateral to multilateral institutions, there is also likely to be a bias in favour of multinational projects. The Bank could usefully exploit this trend by actively encouraging multinational projects and joint financing. The fear must be that as aid becomes more multilateral, it carries with it the anonymity of the original donor. On past and present evidence donor-identification with particular projects has been an essential element in aid giving from the point of view of the political and economic advantages arising from it. It is unlikely that all aid will originate from multilateral institutions in the near future, and yet there is a real possibility that donor countries may reduce direct aid below what they could afford, but only consistent to their proportions of contributions with other countries. This danger arises even more so in the European Economic Community especially with Britain's membership.
The possibility of this danger is not ruled out by the likelihood of the African countries taking up the first of the three options of association with the EC, open to them. It emphasises more than ever, the need for an imaginative and extensive exploitation of all the possible mechanisms of obtaining more funds. In the event of the African countries taking option one of the association with the EC, the European Development Fund would then have to cover a wider geographical area of Africa than hitherto. It would, almost immediately, become an additional serious competitor to the ADB, offering terms on loans, which are superior to those of the World Bank ~1
What this analysis suggests is the complete hopelessness of the position of the ADB insofar as its inability to compete with other institutions in. the field of aid is concerned. It does not appear that the tendency of member countries of the Bank to "channel projects in the first instance to customary sources of finance, coming to the African Development Bank if they are unsuccessful elsewhere" will be avoidable in the near future. What is required at the moment is the judicious exploitation by the Bank of the various possibilities which exist, some of which we have outlined above. Inability to compete on the loan market does not necessarily impair the influence of the Bank which it could still exercise in the initiation of project studies and coordinating action. In the final analysis, however, the Bank will be what its members make it, and on this, they could choose to make it an appendage of the other multinational institutions or the catalyst, their supervisor and coordinator. Which of these will emerge remains to be seen.
